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THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE PARIS ACADEMY OF SCIENCES for February 1776
record major disagreements among chemists on the subject of "fixed air" (carbon dioxide). The problem was not so much the substance as the phrase: "they generally agree well enough upon the thing, but they are not in accord about the name."' This strife over names went deep and escalated to a raging debate a little over a decade later, following Antoine Laurent Lavoisier's and his collaborators' introduction of their new chemical nomenclature. At the same time as chemists argued over the proper language for conducting their new science, political revolutionaries establishing a system of civic education debated the best language for molding a new citizenry. The scientific and political disputes about language overlapped, centrally involving some of the same people and many of the same arguments. This essay suggests that both disputes were propelled by a rivalry between two conceptions of language, which I will introduce in Section I, proposing to call them "cultural" and "social."
In a 1959 essay entitled "The Encyclopedie and the Jacobin Philosophy of Science: A Study in Ideas and Consequences," Charles Gillispie sought a connection between revolutionary politics and contemporary natural science. He argued that the Jacobins' "resentment for the new chemistry," their broader attack on academic science, and even, by implication, their violent radicalization of the Revolution were the outcomes of a volatile combination that had emerged around midcentury in Encyclopedism: an antimodem, Romantic natural philosophy coupled with a politics more populist than liberal. This proposal generated much controversy, driven by the difficulty of demonstrating links between par-I Registre des proces-verbaux (24 Feb. 1776), Archives de l'Acad6mie des Sciences, Paris. The previous spring, Lavoisier had claimed before the academy that "fixed air" was a misnomer, for the substance was not released during burning from fixation in a solid but was produced by the combustion of "the eminently respirable portion of the air" (oxygen) with charcoal. See Antoine Laurent Lavoisier, "Principe qui se combine," in Oeuvres de Lavoisier, 6 vols., Vols. The interlocking chemical and pedagogical disputes about language indicate a new way of analyzing these resonances between scientific and political argument. They resist the standard divisions between premodem and modem science, or tradition and Enlightenment, or revolution and counter-revolution. Instead, the competing cultural and social conceptions of language express conflicting views of how to carry out the projects of modem science, enlightened philosophy, and political reform. The movement of this rivalry of idioms between a scientific and a political dispute exemplifies an often-overlooked interaction between science and politics: an interaction, not through established fact or proven principle, but through shared disagreements and ambivalences.
A story about conflicts, ambivalences, and interdisciplinary interactions needs a binding element. Here that element is a universal preoccupation with language. Running beneath the disagreements and between the disciplines lay the common ascription to words of a deep and manifold efficacy. The capacity of words to shape ideas and, through ideas, cultures and societies was seen as central not just to arguments in the natural sciences but to psychological, pedagogical, and political debate-debate, that is, in the so-called moral sciences.3 Many hoped that the common action of language would serve as a master key, disclosing the foundations not only of the separate projects of philosophizing, teaching, and governing, but also of the relations joining these projects into an interdependent whole.
A rich body of recent work on the new chemical nomenclature has examined its epistemological function, on the one hand, and has called attention to the moral and political tenor of the surrounding controversy, on the other. But there has been little study of the relation between the two. Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, in the introductory essay to her 1983 edition of the nomenclature, proposed that the lexicon was a "complex of claims, not just chemical, but also philosophical and even political."4 The philosophical and po- 
I. TWO CHEMISTRIES OF LANGUAGE
Gabriel Fran,ois Venel, professor of chemistry at the University of Montpellier, early staked out his position in the struggle over a language for the emerging science of chemistry. Venel was the chief writer on chemical topics for Diderot's Encyclopedie and the author of its article entitled "Chymie." Here he called chemists a "distinct people" with their "own independent manner" of conceiving things, a manner "which gives them a language" of their own. Arguing the importance of preserving this separate language for chemistry, Venel appealed to the Lockean epistemological principle that knowledge derives entirely from sensory experience. He praised the "chemical idiom" for expressing "reflections suggested by the immediate exercise of the senses." A distinct language, recording chemists' unique experience of nature's diversity, yoked their science firmly to their sensations.8
Similarly, Venel admired the experience-based language of chemical artisans and even respected the enigmatic writings of ancient alchemy for having been "rich in facts." Indeed, he deemed obscurity itself a virtue in chemical writing. In his view, the clarity and order so admired by "the journalists, the novelists, the Poets," actually distorted scientific research. The artificial clarity of systematic treatises belied the burgeoning confusion of sensory experience. Luckily, the opacity of chemists' argot shielded their philosophy from the fashionable spirit of system. The style of the German chemist Georg Stahl was a model: "difficult" and "dense," it preserved chemistry from becoming "a' la mode" while at the same time "swarming with the sort of images that spread from the sensible object."9
"Chymie" appears oddly contradictory. Venel argues initially, in terms that Gillispie has described as proto-Jacobin, that the "high contemplations" of natural philosophy are nothing but the "experience of the worker covered with the varnish of science." But to defend chemistry against the trend toward system building, he ultimately concludes that it should be reserved for an elite of connoisseurs. Writing for the third volume of Diderot's Encyclopedie, the mission of which was to disseminate arcane knowledge, rendering the arts and sciences accessible to a literate public, Venel nonetheless closes with a vindication of "obscurity" in chemical writing.'0 These contradictions no doubt reflect a general uncertainty about the Encyclopedie's project: at once to celebrate the specialized technical knowledge of craftspeople and to challenge the cloistering of such knowledge within the crafts, two purposes that could fall into conflict.
But it is possible to make sense of Venel's contradictions. He did not intend to shield chemistry behind a veil of secrecy. On the contrary, the article opens by regretting the general "incuriosity" about chemists and their work. In its most cited passage, Venel calls for a "new Paracelsus," "clever, enthusiastic, and bold," who would place chemistry on a par with physics. This new Paracelsus would promote chemistry through powerful language, with a "noisy ostentation ... a decided and affirmative tone.'9"" Venel's project was certainly public relations. He meant to popularize chemistry; only his was a particular, and somewhat polemical, conception of chemistry and so, too, of chemical language. Venel wrote that chemical theories were not rational expositions but "exhibitions" of nature. They were derived not from principles but from unguided "groping," from the "vague signs" chemists were able to divine in their objects, and from what he described as chemists' capacity for "experimental premonition." Physics and chemistry, each with its own "general manner of envisaging" its subjects, must each have a "different language." While the language of physics was rigorous and mathematical, chemistry would always be "vague and approximate." Chemists' knowledge, Venel implied, could be expressed but not articulated; it was a matter of sensation and intuition, not system. 12 A manner of thinking, a mode of speech, a way of life, all rooted in a natural basis of physical sensation and instinctive response: these were principal ingredients also in the nascent conception of culture.'3 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac defined "culture" in his Dictionnaire des synonymes as "the care one gives to a piece of land to render it fertile. It is said figuratively of customs, the mind, the sciences, etc." By analogy, one did not deliberately invent customs, manners of thought, or sciences according to first principles, but only fostered their natural growth. To "cultivate" the "mind, the memory, the arts, the sciences," was a matter of developing one's responsiveness to this organic process-one's sensibilities and intuitions-more than one's rational faculty. Candide and his comrades, cultivating their garden, resolved to "work without reasoning." Though Venel's recommendation to chemists to shun the systematizing "tone" of contemporary physics and return to the traditional "chemical idiom" was in that sense reactionary, his project was, in its effort to preserve a cultural identity, strikingly modern. In the language of enlightened political philosophy, Venel defended the "right" of chemists to their idiosyncratic style as at once a "liberty" and a "possession." His ideal of scientific language was far from oldfashioned; it retained its vitality through the last years of the century. Those who adopted Macquer's project of renaming chemical substances believed that language directed as well as recounted experience, shaped as well as described experiments. Rather than growing spontaneously, as a jargon, from accreted experiences and responses, chemical theory was to be engineered, as a lexicon, from first principles. Thus Bergman observed that technical words, "like coins, owe their currency to prescription."' 8 A science depended upon a conventional vocabulary, just as a society relied upon a conventional system of values. These conventions were formal, expressing no inarticulable intuitive power. They were deliberately chosen and could be deliberately altered.
If the conception of language informing Venel's "Chymie" was a cultural one, the new chemists' model of scientific language might well be described as social. The word "so- cial," we learn from Diderot's Encyclopedie, was also a "word newly introduced into the language," used to designate that which suited one "to the commerce of men."'9 Whereas "culture" implied shared intangibles-modes of thought, varieties of experience and intuition-"social" denoted deliberate and rule-governed collaboration. Condillac defined "social" as pertaining to those "qualities that render one suited to society" and "society" iii-iv. It should be noted that though Bergman had preserved a basic commitment to naturally derived names, he had also begun to move in the direction of arbitrary naming, writing words they represent," he wrote, "in reality have, by themselves, no relation, no conformity with things." So, in the case of an individual substance that one "envisions only for itself," and not in relation to any other substance, any name that "means nothing" would serve the purpose. In fact, he preferred meaningless names for such independently considered substances and recommended that nomenclators "distance themselves as much as possible from familiar usage." For the purpose, he advised taking roots from classical rather than vulgar languages.23
Linguistic conventions were prior to meaning, Morveau believed, and therefore they were themselves meaningless. They alone connected sounds with things. In the case of chemistry, only after convention had "attached a first idea to a word" could denominations be sought that expressed, in a limited way, the natures of their objects. For example, having arbitrarily assigned a name to a substance, chemists could give its derivatives names that were derived from its name.24 These derived names would then express the derivative substances' natures, but only in terms of the original, arbitrary name. The empirical truth of chemical names was thus, to Morveau, necessarily a derivative truth, ultimately founded in arbitrary convention.
He did not confine his arguments to chemical language, nor yet to the technical vocabularies of natural philosophy, but intended them to apply to language in general. And indeed, the notion that names refer only arbitrarily to their objects was a principal element in Condillac' s theory of language, upon which Morveau and Lavoisier both drew heavily. Locke had warned natural philosophers against "abusing" words by "taking them for Things" and indeed had drawn an example from chemistry to illustrate this pitfall. The word "gold," Locke claimed, referred not to any real thing-gold, but only to a certain complex of sensations and perceptions that people attributed to some essentially unknowable object. When chemists demonstrated, for example, the "Fixedness or Solubility" of gold under certain conditions, they merely expanded the definition of the word "gold" by adding an experience to the complex. Yet chemists were seduced by their own language into thinking that they had perfected their idea of the thing itself. Locke's firm belief in the eternal impossibility of understanding natural objects in themselves led him to conclude that natural philosophy was just "not capable of being made a Science."27 But if language was no source of natural knowledge, it was, Locke wrote, the medium of "Society," God having "designed Man for a sociable creature." Moreover, moral philosophers did not share natural philosophers' worries about words, not studying natural entities but only social conventions, or what Locke called "mixed modes." Because mixed modes were essentially conventional, they entailed no gap between name and object. The "real Essence" of a mixed mode was a matter of definition and could be fully captured by language. So, for example, a moral philosopher might distinguish among "Chance-medly, Man-slaughter, Murther, Parricide" without risk of abusing the terms. The actual things to which these words referred were themselves conventions, identical to the definitions of their names. Words simply dictated the difference between, say, murder and manslaughter. This capacity for precision in moral philosophy meant, to Locke, that morality, in contrast with chemistry, was "capable of Demonstration, as well as In keeping with this instruction, Lavoisier sought the source of scientific errors in the popular misuse of words. Studying transpiration in animals, for example, and the reason why humidity renders heat more disagreeable, he interposed a rigorous analysis of a common phrase. To say that "the weather is heavy," Lavoisier remonstrated, was to mix several statements into an enunciation so "vague" as to be true only because "it presents no determinate idea." The exact meaning of "the weather is heavy" must be some combination of "the air just now has no dissolving virtue, it is saturated with water; insensible transpiration is suppressed, and replaced with sweat." The mixing of statements always reflected an essential ignorance of causes. In order to discover causes, one had first to identify and label their separate effects-to analyze phenomena, in Condillac's terms, by means of the art of naming.32
When Lavoisier and his collaborators later devised a new language for their science, they would assume, following Condillac, that the knowledge of natural causes relied upon the social institution of language. With Condillac, they denied that philosophy arose naturally from either sensation or ge'nie. However necessary sensation was to the progress of a science, Lavoisier and Morveau maintained that it was insufficient. To keep themselves on the straight and narrow path to truth, chemists needed something else: a "well-made language" expressing neither individual experience nor cultural identity. By its very neutrality, this language would permit philosophical collaboration, the reciprocal commerce of people prerequisite in Condillac's philosophy to rational thought.33
The new chemical nomenclature of 1787 rested upon two axioms drawn from Condillac's philosophy of language: that names are social conventions, and that all thinking is therefore dependent upon a social institution, the institution of language. These tenets were responsible for the two most interesting and radical features of the new chemical language.
The first of these concerns the names of the elements and Morveau's principle of arbitrary names for the simplest entities. In keeping with this principle, the elements' names ought to have been meaningless. In practice, they were neither arbitrary nor meaningless, except in a limited, technical, but nonetheless significant, sense. Only four names in the table were entirely new: caloric (heat), oxygen, hydrogen, and azote (nitrogen). And even these four had meanings. The nomenclators did follow Morveau' s earlier recommendation of using classical roots to distance their technical language from the vernacular. But they coined names whose etymologies reflected salient characteristics of an element (e.g., "hydrogen" to suggest a relation to water or "oxygen" to acids). Lavoisier explained that these meaningful etymologies were to "relieve the memories of beginners, who retain with difficulty a new word when it is absolutely empty of meaning." Even Morveau conceded that "altogether meaningless words" offered no "hold for the memory. named twenty-two simple substances that they had not yet isolated, forming names from the word "radical" and the relevant acid-for example, "citric radical." The first column of the nomenclature listed the simplest substances; of these, numbers nine through thirty (out of fifty-five) were the undiscovered bases of undecomposed acids. The new chemists' commitment to a language founded in the assignment of arbitrary names to simple objects made the entire nomenclature dependent upon the elements. Yet almost half of these were unknown substances. In turn, nearly all the acids were named in terms of these unknowns. And likewise for the salts, which were named in terms of the acids, and therefore in terms of the elements. This domino effect meant that more than half of the new chemical names, compounds and elements alike, involved references to substances not yet discovered.39 (See Frontispiece.)
To say that the nomenclature was an artifice is by no means to say that it was a fiction. On the contrary, in the eyes of its authors, the nomenclature's whole value lay in the empirical truths it would generate. But, they held, language could be a "faithful mirror" of nature only through artifice, the conventional manipulation of arbitrary signs. The result was a scientific language conceived as an institution, not an expression. The new nomenclature was engineered to precede and direct experiment, even more than to follow and describe experience. 40 Lavoisier, "N6cessit6 de perfectionner la nomenclature de la chimie" (cit. n. 1.7), pp. 14, 16-17; and Antoine Laurent Lavoisier, "Rapport sur les nouveaux caracteres chimiques" (1787), in Oeuvres, Vol. 5, ed. Grimaux (cit. n. 1), p. 378. There was a recent precedent for the predictive use of names in chemistry. Macquer's proposals for the binomial naming of salts according to their constituents, presented in his Dictionnaire de chymie, included names of unknown salts that he assumed could be made from familiar metals, like gold, tin, zinc, and antimony. See Crosland, Historical Studies in the Language of Chemistry (cit. n. 4), p. 137. I am grateful to Frederic Lawrence Holmes for bringing this precedent to my attention. 41 Whether the nomenclators were correct in assigning such importance to language in the progress of their science is a controversial matter. Frederic Holmes has objected that the theories of composition expressed in the nomenclature were virtually complete before the language reform was begun; thus the nomenclators' own previous research belied their claims for the necessity of linguistic change to scientific progress. In the following discussion, I respond to this objection by suggesting that Lavoisier's attention to language long predated his work on the nomenclature itself. More generally, however, I am interested in the nomenclators' theory of scientific language. That theory informed their transformation of their science and its language, whether or not it presented a strictly accurate representation of their own trajectory.
ited Turgot with having "fixed the sense" of a new word, thereby making available "the most vast and the newest views." One view that "expansibility" helped Lavoisier to adopt was that airiness was a state rather than a kind of matter. That is, he surmised, any common body "in a state of expansibility" would make a gas. Moreover, if aerial fluids were not intrinsically airy, but could pass from a state of "expansibility" to one of solidity, then oxygen might pass from the air to combine with roasted metals. Thus, the second view "expansibility" supported was that combustion was the combination of a substance with oxygen, rather than the release of a hypothetical fiery substance that contemporary chemists called "phlogiston. stances so uncommon as to be found only in the laboratory. By Condillac' s art of naming, they bestowed upon the rare products of these experiments the status of elementary substances. Their opponents did not object to the experiments themselves but to the practice of naming the results as basic substances, which they judged an inversion of the natural order of experience.
So, for example, the commission appointed by the Academy of Sciences to evaluate the new nomenclature doubted whether it was "more natural" to consider sulfur, composed in a laboratory from vitriolic (sulfuric) acid and hydrogen, as a simple substance than to treat common air as elemental. In general, they hesitated to credit a "crowd" of simple substances that "all analogy" seemed to suggest were actually composed, being the endproducts of laboratory procedures, in place of the traditional four elements, found everywhere in nature. Jean Francois De Machy, one of the most outspoken opponents, had the same quarrel with calling sulfur an element. The substance was, he said, "not even natural in a volcano ... too many complicated conditions are necessary to obtain it." He found it foolish to "take the products of art" for nature' s own elements. To name the acids according to the products of their decompositions, rather than naming the products according to the acids from which they were derived, seemed to De Machy sheer perversity: "Products, the last efforts of analyzing subtlety, taken for elements, for principles !"4s
De Of Lavoisier, Marat wrote scathingly: "he changes systems as he changes his shoes ... he changed the term acide to oxygine, the term phlogistique to azot, the term marin to muriatique, the term nitreux to nitrique and nitraque. Voila his claims to immortality."'56 The argument about the nature and function of scientific language had moral and political resonance from the start-but the political implications of this debate were as ambiguous as they were apparent. Detractors of the nomenclature held views across the political spectrum, prominently including a Mason, a Jacobin, and a constitutional monarchist, as well as both Sage and Marat, on the French side, and Edmund Burke as well as Joseph Priestley among the British.s7
The variety in political motivations and larger political affiliations among the nomenclature's critics makes their considerable common ground even more significant. They agreed upon both the epistemological principle that experience always precedes language and the moral injunction against denying this precedence. If, as McEvoy and Golinski suggest, some of these critics were meritocrats and others democrats, some communitarians and others traditionalists, these opposing political categories shared a common logic, the logic of Lockean empiricism. The distinction I have been proposing, between cultural and social conceptions of scientific language, may be useful here. It runs orthogonally to broad political conflicts between Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment, or revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, and so turns up a quieter but no less effective set of differences, addressing how to pursue the programs of Enlightenment and revolution.
During the Revolution, as during the concurrent argument over scientific language, the political implications of systematic linguistic reform were always ambiguous. The question of whether language records past experience or directs future experience, whether it codifies knowledge or creates it, was intensely controversial, in particular in the debate sur- Rouelle's courses were attended by Rousseau, Buffon, and Diderot, the last for three years running, and met with almost universal approval. Diderot's enthusiasm was such that he had his notes copied for distribution, and Venel closed his article "Chymie" with a plug for Rouelle's lectures. Lavoisier, however, had some serious misgivings about the master's methods, misgivings that focused on Rouelle' s use of language. Many years later, in some notes on the teaching of chemistry, he recalled his confusion during Rouelle's course. "I had been accustomed," he wrote, "to that rigor of reasoning which mathematicians put into their work." In chemistry it had been "another world ... they presented me with words that they were not at all in a position to define."70 Like Condillac, Lavoisier likened linguistic to mathematical analysis and found rigorous language essential to good teaching.
Lavoisier Taxation in 1791, he argued the importance of rigorous definitions. Writers on agricultural wealth had, he claimed, mistreated their subject through an inexact use of words, making "a host of double and triple uses; they counted the same value two or three times, and arrived at false and exaggerated results." He gave the example of tallying the costs of a farm by entering the prices of straw and wheat separately. This was a mistake, for since straw was converted into manure and used in the production of wheat, its value was "implicitly mingled into that of the wheat." The same principle applied to horses' fodder and oats: their value made up part of the value of the final product. 73 To distinguish intermediate from final products, Lavoiser named three separate categories: the "natural agricultural product," which included products consumed in the making of other products as well as those ultimately convertible into money; the "real revenue" in money or products convertible into money; and the "net revenue," the amount claimed by proprietors and taxes, once the "expenses and charges of farming" had been subtracted. Condorcet identified a cause of errors in the moral sciences that Condillac had already indicated in the natural sciences and that the new chemists had highlighted in their nomenclature. It was a linguistic problem, the use of words that had, "in the vulgar language, different meanings than their philosophical senses." Condorcet charged public instruction in the moral sciences with the task of transforming these words for public usage, supplying people with "the rigor and precision of their philosophical senses." Instruction must collapse the linguistic distance between "the man and the philosophe," because, Condorcet believed, justice depended "uniquely upon precision of ideas" and, therefore, of language. 77 Condorcet, Sieyes, and Duhamel's ideal of social education rested on a recognition of the shortcomings of dogmatic empiricism. Sieyes denied that the science of society should be based upon an empirical study of the historical record. Nor, according to Condorcet, should it be founded in natural facts. He called public instruction an "eternal battle ... between nature and genius, between man and things." Education should counteract nature. The purpose of social institutions, Condorcet judged, was to "diminish ... natural inequality." The innate superiority of some would not engender dependence in others if all were made conversant in the essential conventions and institutions governing social life: the three R's and the elements of law. The first year of Condorcet's proposed educational program was thus taken up with reading and writing and focused heavily upon the acquisition of vocabulary. Students should be taught, Condorcet said, that language is the guide of sensory experience and that books would train them to "see better." He also recommended the use of technical terms in teaching children. Scientific language was preferable to vulgar language, he said, because its "convention" was "less tacit." 78 Condorcet was criticized for his departure from the principle that all ideas originate in sensations. A reviewer of his memoirs on public instruction derided him for stating that men were born with virtuous "habits" and an innate moral sense. How, the reviewer asked, could "a being who has never acted have habits, when its memory is a blank slate?" Within the Committee on Public Instruction, too, Condorcet defended an increasingly unpopular position. The division of sentiment was encapsulated in a distinction drawn by Jean-Paul Rabaut, a speaker before the National Convention who so impressed the members of the Committee on Public Instruction that they invited him to join their ranks. Rabaut distinguished between instruction and education: while instruction sought to enlighten the mind with "books, instruments, calculations, methods," education was a matter of cultivating the "body and heart" by means of "circuses, gymnasia, weapons, public games." He concluded that a state should educate its citizens, but never instruct them. A pattern can be discerned in both the chemical debate and the quarrel over public instruction. In both the scientific and the political controversy, those who distrusted systematic linguistic conventions and emphasized the importance of raw sensory experience joined an epistemological theory with an evolving conception of culture. They sought a natural basis for culture in sensory experience and in a philosophical language directly expressive of sensation and emotion. These empiricist theorists of language wanted to rediscover a world unsullied by human systems of thinking and governing and to grow their philosophy organically from it. 81 They sought therefore to rid philosophy of system and to rid civic education of instruction.
In contrast, those who emphasized the importance of language in the formation of ideas promoted a social rather than a cultural epistemology. In their view, the language of a science or a society was no organic product, received from nature as an accretion of spontaneous expressions of physical sensations and answering emotions. Languages, sci-entific and common, were deliberately molded things. These systematic reformers sought to understand a world that they believed was inevitably shaped by their own efforts, whether to understand, to teach, or to govern. They made no pretense; they wanted not only to understand the world but to change it and to control its other inhabitants. They wanted to effect their control by shaping not experience or emotion, but understanding. As pedagogues they believed that human nature could be much improved by social intervention. And as philosophers they believed that they could actively invent rather than merely passively receive truths about nature.
It would be a mistake, I believe, to treat this divergence as a struggle between tradition and progress. Both Venel's and Morveau's philosophies of language expressed central Enlightenment preoccupations: cultural diversity and empiricism on the one hand, social universalism and epistemological rigor on the other. Similarly, in the pedagogical conflict, Condorcet and his opponents were united in their rejection of traditional methods and their call for modern-even republican-ones. The quarrel over language use in teaching and scientific research persisted precisely because its two sides defined no easy contrast between modernity and antiquity, progress and tradition, revolution and counter-revolution. Both sides professed an earnest wish to move beyond the mistakes and constraints of the Old Regime into a remodeled modern world. Beneath their divergent theories of how to carry out the remodeling, they shared a common project. And so they remained locked in dispute.
Post-Thermidorian Ideologues, the practitioners of a new science of ideas that included neurophysiology and criminal psychology, would seek the widespread moral and political application of Condillac's philosophy of language. They would invoke Lavoisier's chemistry as evidence of their linguistic program's validity. Discussion of civic education would return time and again to the problem of the relative roles of sensations and words in shaping pupils' intellects and moral faculties. The nomenclators' chemical language would gain an ever-wider acceptance, and their conception of chemical research as the elaboration of a table of names an ever-mounting success, in the first decades of the next century. Even so, their assumption that a science's language does not just express its practitioners' experiences, but actively shapes its progress, would remain controversial. Georges Cuvier, in his Napoleonic retrospective of French science, could yet declare that "to intend [the nomenclature] as an instrument of discovery" was "ridiculous." 82 
